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Abstract 
This study examines how the risk-taking incentive of top executives drives the strategic 
risk-taking in corporate IT implementation. We use the risk incentive provided in 
executive compensation to capture top executives’ risk-taking incentive, and develop 
measures of aggressive IT implementation to capture strategic risk-taking in IT 
implementation. Our analysis provides empirical evidence that the risk incentive of 
executive compensation drives aggressive IT implementation. We also consider how 
firm diversification may influence the relationship between the risk incentive of top 
executives and aggressive IT implementation. Our finding indicates that the 
relationship between the risk incentive of top executives and aggressive IT 
implementation is stronger in focal firms’ primary industries than in their secondary 
industries, which suggests that diversification supports IT risk taking by providing risk-
seeking executives more opportunities in the areas that are less familiar to them. 
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Introduction 
Both practitioners and scholars have recognized the risk associated with investments in Information 
Technology (IT). For example, a recent report by Gartner indicates that in business organizations 20% of 
small IT projects (<$350,000 in budget), 25% of midsize IT projects ($350,000~$1M), and 28% large IT 
projects (>$1M) eventually fail (i.e., deliver no return at all) (Mieritz 2012). The finding is consistent with 
many earlier studies that suggest that nearly a quarter of IT projects in business organizations fail 
completely (Levinson 2009). Moreover, a recent study by McKinsey Quarterly reveals that large IT 
projects often deliver less return than expected, even when they do not fail. Half of IT projects with 
budgets of over $15 million dollars run 45% over budget, are 7% behind schedule and deliver 56% less 
functionality than planned.  This means that at least half the time — achieving at least $15 million in 
benefits, requires spending $59 million (Bloch et al. 2012). Academic research also suggests that IT 
investments often lead to uncertainty in firms’ operational and market performance (Dewan and Ren 2011; 
Tanriverdi and Ruefli 2004), and the risk of IT investments is often higher than that of other investments 
(Dewan et al. 2007). 
Given the risky nature of IT, it is imperative to understand what drives organizations to take the risks to 
implement IT projects. Most prior studies on risk-taking in IT adoption are project-level or individual-
level studies which explain risky behavior mainly from the perspective of individual risk perception (Keil 
et al. 2000; Palvou and Gefen 2004; Nicolaou and McKnight 2006). However, the corporate-level studies 
on what motivates strategic IT risk-taking are scant. In this research, we explore IT risk taking from the 
perspective of executive compensation. Our main proposition is that the compensation structure is a key 
mechanism to influence the risk-taking incentives of top managers, and it will also affect firms’ strategic 
choices of investing in riskier IT assets.  
The relationship between executive compensation structure and corporate risk-taking has been studied 
extensively in the finance (e.g., Coles et al. 2006), accounting (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002) and 
strategy management literature (e.g., Eisenmann 2002). In general, prior studies find that when 
compensation structure is designed to motivate risk-taking of top executives, more risky firm strategies 
are likely to be observed. The risky firm strategies examined in the literature includes R&D expenditure, 
business focus, corporate leverage, resource exploration, corporate derivative holding, etc. (Cohen et al. 
2000; Knoph et al. 2002; Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006). Executive compensation is also 
found to influence the overall firm risk (e.g., stock return volatility) (Guay 1999). All of these findings 
suggest that executive compensation is a key driver of corporate-level strategic risk taking. However, so 
far there is no research examining the link between executive compensation and corporate IT risk-taking. 
A number of prior studies in the Information Systems (IS) literature, mainly drawing upon the upper-
echelon theory, have suggested that top management plays a major role in shaping corporate IT strategies 
(Clemons and Row 1988; Jarvenpaa and Ives 1991; Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999). Based on this 
logic, the top executives’ risk-taking incentives should foster corporate strategies of IT risk-taking. When 
top executives are motivated by the compensation structure, it is likely to observe more risk-taking 
initiatives in corporate IT implementations. This study bridges this gap in the literature by explicitly 
examining the relationship between top executive compensation and the corporate IT risk taking.  
Another key issue considered in this study is the influence of firm diversification on IT risk taking. The 
existing research has mainly focused on how firm diversification affects overall corporate risk taking. 
However, it is not clear when firms diversify into various business areas, how their risk taking actions 
differ in different areas. In this study, we use more detailed IT data to examine this issue in the context of 
IT risk taking. Specifically, we consider how the risk incentive provided in top executive compensation 
leads to different levels of IT risk taking in the firm’s primary industries (i.e., core business areas) and 
secondary industries (i.e., other business areas that the firm diversifies into).  
A key issue in studying the impact of executive compensation on risk taking is to characterize the risk 
incentive (i.e., the incentive that motivates risk taking) in compensation and distinguish it from the 
performance incentive (i.e., the incentive that motivates performance enhancement). Although many 
prior studies use option compensation as an indicator of managerial risk-taking incentive, it is worth 
remarking that option compensation essentially provides both risk incentive and the performance 
incentive. However, the risk incentive and performance incentive may have different implications for risk 
taking. The classic principal-agency model used to study corporate governance (Grossman and Hart 1983; 
Jensen and Murphy 1990) assumes a risk-neutral principal (owner) and a risk-averse agent (executive). 
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The performance incentive of compensation, which ties the agent’s income with the uncertain 
performance of the firm and thus exposes the agent to firm risk, may eventually discourage risk-taking by 
the agent. Therefore, many recent studies (e.g., Guay 1999; Core and Guay 2002; Coles et al. 2006) 
separate the risk incentive and performance incentive in option compensation so as to better assess how 
executive compensation influences the incentive of managers to seek risk.    
In this study, we follow the existing literature to use option vega to evaluate the risk incentive of executive 
compensation. Option vega refers to the sensitivity of the executive’s option portfolio value to stock return 
volatility (the market risk of firm). Higher vega means that top executives gains more by pursuing more 
market risk in making strategic decisions. Therefore, designing compensation structure with high vega 
enables firm owners to motivate more risk-taking behavior in executives. A number of prior studies in the 
finance and accounting literature (Guay 1999; Coles et al. 2006; Knoph et al. 2002; Rajgopal and Shevlin 
2002) have used vega to explicitly capture the risk-taking incentive of top executives, and distinguish it 
from the performance incentive that generally ties executive income with firm performance (e.g., option 
delta). We therefore employ vega to study how executive compensation may motivate strategic IT risk-
taking.  
Another key issue is to characterize IT risk-taking. As IT is a general-purpose technology (Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt 1998), not all IT decisions are driven by strategic risk-taking motives. In this study, we develop 
measures that capture the extent to which firms aggressively outpace their industry competitors in 
increasing their IT implementation (we name them measures of aggressive IT implementation). 
Aggressive IT implementation reflects the intention of firms to strategically deviate from the industry 
norm by using more IT to digitize their business processes. Considering the typical challenges in IT 
implementation (e.g., technological uncertainty, managerial complexity, etc.), firms need to bear high risk 
if they deviate from the established patterns (or, the industry norm) to implement more IT. In this regard, 
we use the measures of aggressive IT implementation to capture the strategic risk-taking in IT. We also 
validate the use these measures by showing how these measures of aggressive IT implementation actually 
contribute to firm risk. We then examine how top executive compensation may influence the aggressive IT 
implementation, and how this influence may differ in the focal firm’s primary and secondary industries.  
This study provides important findings that contribute to multiple streams of research. First, our study 
provides direct evidence that higher vega of executive compensation leads to more aggressive IT 
implementation by firms. This result provides clear support to the arguments in the IS literature on how 
top management plays an important role in shaping the corporate IT strategies. It also complements the 
existing finance and accounting literature on how top executive compensation structure influences 
corporate risk-taking strategies. Second, our results suggest that the relationship between vega and 
aggressive IT implementation is stronger in focal firms’ primary industries than in their secondary 
industries. The implication is that diversification supports IT risk taking by providing risk-seeking 
executives more opportunities in the areas that they are less familiar with and thus is associated with 
more uncertainty for them. This new insight better explains how firm diversification fosters corporate 
risk-taking, and this explanation has not been well developed in the existing literature.  
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
Theoretical Background: Executive Compensation and Corporate Risk-Taking 
The main theoretical foundation in most of the existing research on executive compensation is the 
principal-agent theory. The basic framework of principal-agent models (Grossman and Hart 1983; Jensen 
and Murphy 1990) assumes that the risk-neutral principal (shareholders) needs to design compensation 
structure to align the incentive of risk-averse agent (executives) with their own. A common practice is to 
make executive compensation based partially on certain observable signals of firm performance, such as 
stock price. In this way, executives are provided with the incentive to improve firm performance (named 
performance incentive hereafter). However, the side effect of performance incentive is that executives are 
exposed to firm risk and their risk-aversion drives them to forego risky firm strategies. The existing 
literature has provided evidence on the negative relationship between performance incentive and risky 
action choices, such as R&D (Dechow and Sloan 1991).   
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To correct executives’ incentives on risk taking, option compensation is often conceivable because the 
convex payoff structure it offers should offset the concavity of the utility function of risk-averse executives 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Smith and Watts 1992; Core and Guay 1999). However, it is worth noting that 
option compensation provides both performance incentive and risk incentive. When options are in-the-
money (i.e., the exercise price is lower than the share price), their value change with both the performance 
(stock price) and the risk (stock return volatility). Therefore, the fluctuation of option value caused by the 
stock price movement may still be a concern for risk-averse managers (who dislike the uncertainty in 
income), and such concern may discourage risk-taking. On the other hand, option value may also increase 
in the stock price volatility. Such feature is reflected by the measure of vega. Vega has been defined as the 
sensitivity of the executive’s option value to stock return volatility (or market risk) (Guay 1999), and 
positive vega means that the option is of more valuabl when stock price becomes more volatile or the 
market risk of the firm becomes higher. In this sense, higher vega may eventually correct the risk-aversion 
of executives and motivate them to seek risk by adopting more risky firm policies and taking on more 
risky projects. Although the measure vega can also be derived for the executive’s stock holding, past 
research has shown that option vega is many times higher than stock vega (Guay 1999). Consequently, 
option vega has been commonly used in the literature to measure the overall compensation incentive that 
motivates executives to take risk (Coles et al. 2006; Knoph et al. 2002; Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002). In 
this study, we follow these prior studies to use option vega as a proxy for the overall risk incentive 
provided in executive compensation.  
A number of studies in the existing literature have provided empirical evidence on the positive 
relationship between vega and various firm risk-taking strategies. For example, higher vega has been 
found to be associated with higher corporate leverage (Cohen et al. 2000), higher stock return volatility 
(Guay 1999), more R&D expenditure (Coles et al. 2006), more resource exploration effort (Rajgopal and 
Shevlin 2002), and less use of risk-hedging derivatives (Knoph et al. 2002). These findings support the 
view that compensation structure with high vega provides the incentive for executives to adopt high-risk 
strategies in improving the firm performance.    
IT and Firm Risk 
IT is considered as riskier asset because it often leads to uncertainty of operational and market 
performance. For example, prior studies have found that IT is often associated with uncertain future cash 
flow (Hunter et al. 2008). Consequently, traditional accounting approaches may not be enough to assess 
the value of IT investment and justify IT investment (Tallon et al. 2000). Also, the strategic value of IT 
may not be anticipated by equity investors in the financial market, and therefore the launch of IT 
initiatives may lead to uncertain market reactions, increasing the market risk of the firm (Dewan and Ren 
2007). All of these evidence indicates that IT is likely to be directly associated with high firm risk. In 
addition to the direct impact on firm risk, IT may also indirectly contribute to firm risk through other 
strategic movements. For example, prior studies have shown that IT is often used to support other risky 
firm strategies such as R&D (Kleis et al. 2012; Xue et al. 2012). In this regard, IT is also likely to 
contribute to firm risk through other risky actions.  
Despite the overall risk effect of IT, not all IT decisions may be driven by strategic risk-taking motives. As 
a general-purpose technology, IT is used to support various organizational activities (Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt 1998), including low-risk routine operations. Therefore, instead of considering overall IT investment 
and implementation, we focus on the portion of IT implementation that better reflects risk-taking in IT. 
We develop a construct named aggressive IT implementation (AITI). AITI is defined as the extent to 
which focal firms exceed their industry peers and competitors in increasing their IT implementations, 
controlling for the operational growth of their businesses. In other words, AITI captures the increase in IT 
implementations that are not explained by the regular needs of operational scale and the common IT 
implementation practices in the focal firm’s industry environment. For example, suppose a firm operates 
in a business environment that typically needs 70 PCs to support every 100 employees. When the firm 
establishes a new business unit with 100 more employees and similar revenue generation capability as 
other existing units, if the firm increases its PCs by 70, it is likely that the firm increases IT to support the 
regular expansion of its existing business practices. In this case, the value of the increase in IT 
implementation can be easily justified by the regular operational needs and there is less uncertainty 
associated with it. If, on the other hand, we observe that the firm increases its total PCs by 120 along with 
a similar operational growth, then the 50 additional PCs can be considered as aggressive IT 
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implementation, as such increase exceeds the industry-norm and is not justified by its operational needs. 
For example, the firm may digitize more of its business processes and increase the IT usage per employee. 
The firm may also utilize the increased IT for more radical innovation in new product/service 
development, for example, the implementation of new in-store technologies. In this case, there is 
uncertainty associated with the value of this aggressive IT implementation as it cannot be explained by the 
traditional measure of operations.    
By strategically using more IT to develop capabilities beyond the existing business scale, firms essentially 
build digital options that enable them to respond to unexpected opportunities and dynamic changes. Such 
strategic agility allows firms to reap benefits from environmental uncertainties. However, by deviating 
from their existing IT practices and industry norms, firms risk facing problems with uncertain solutions. 
In this regard, aggressive IT implementations are a manifestation of strategic risk-taking. Faced with 
uncertainties, risk-averse managers are likely to follow the industry norm of IT implementation and 
usage, as they may believe that imitating the norms can make them less vulnerable to being singled out 
and subject to blame, if their IT implementation decisions are proven to be sub-optimal later (Mithas et 
al. 2013). Industry norms and the actions of competitors provide observable benchmarks to firms for their 
IT implementation decisions, and enable firms to learn from others whom they perceive as successful. 
Strategic deviation from industry norms, in contrast, forces firms to risk losing resources as well as 
support. Prior studies on institutional influence in IT implementation also suggest that firms often choose 
to imitate industry norms in IT implementations in order to minimize risk and experimental cost. 
Therefore, we consider aggressive IT implementations as indicative of IT risk-taking and expect that firms 
engaging in aggressive IT implementations bear more risk. More risk-oriented firms, however, choose to 
strategically take risk through aggressive IT implementations to build long-term competitive advantages. 
Thus, we develop and test the following hypothesis:  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the extent of aggressive IT implementation and firm risk.  
Executive Compensation and IT Risk Taking 
Based on the upper-echelon theory, the IS literature has long argued that top executives exert important 
influence on a firm’s IS strategy. Prior research also indicates that as IT has become imperative to support 
organizational operations and industry competition, senior executives’ views and influence on IT 
investment are instrumental in shaping IT strategies and usage in firms (Bakos and Treacy 1986; Clemons 
and Row 1988; Jarvenpaa and Ives 1991; Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Chatterjee et al. 2002; 
Liang et al. 2007).  
Despite the risky nature of IT and the well-recognized influence of executive compensation on risk taking, 
the IS literature has paid limited attention to the potential impact that executive compensation may have 
on IT risk-taking. In the few studies that relate executive compensation to IT, the focus has mainly been 
on the performance incentive, not the risk incentive of the compensation structure. For example, Talmor 
and Wallace (1998) found that the use of stock-based compensation in the computer industry boosted 
long-term firm growth.  Similarly, Anderson et al. (2000) present evidence that firm performance (stock 
returns) increase with the incentive-payment in executive compensation (i.e., the holdings of options). 
Likewise, Anderson et al. (2002) showed that IT CEOs’ exercisable stock options had stronger 
performance-enhancing effect in the down market of 2000 (compared to the up market in 1990s’) but 
their unexercisable options had weaker performance-enhancing effect. Masli et al. (2007) found that 
firms use performance-based compensation (equity compensation) to motivate IT spending and shield 
CEO cash compensation from the income-decreasing effects of IT spending. The extant literature, 
however, does not say much about whether the risk incentive provided in the compensation (e.g., vega) 
drives executives to undertake more IT initiatives, especially high-risk IT projects.  
Consistent with the logic of upper-echelon theory, we expect that the risk-seeking incentive of top 
executives drives firms’ high-risk IT initiatives. Due to their position and broad perspective about the 
organization, top executives may have unique views about the long-term value of IT which cannot be 
justified by the traditional performance measures (e.g., ROI), especially in the early stages of IT 
investments (Tallon et al. 2000). For example, in order to gain long-term competitive advantage, 
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executives may strategically push for more aggressive IT adoption than their competitors, hoping to more 
radically reengineer their business processes (Jarvenpaa and Ives 1991). Consequently, top executives’ 
willingness to take risks is critical for the undertaking aggressive IT implementation projects, which may 
be associated with uncertain outcomes. Since the vega of compensation provides top executives the 
incentive to seek risk, we expect a positive association between vega and the aggressive IT 
implementation.  
H2: There is a positive relationship between vega and the extent of aggressive IT implemenation.    
Diversification, Executive Compensation and IT Risk Taking 
Firm diversification has long been recognized in the literature as a key factor influencing corporate risk 
taking (Williamson 1975; Hoskisson and Hitt 1988; Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989; Eisenmann 2002). 
Prior studies suggest that diversification may have a complex effect on the overall corporate risk taking 
because it influences various organizational aspects differently. For example, some research argues that 
diversification inhibits corporate strategic risk-taking since divisional managers are likely to avoid risky 
projects so as to meet their local financial performance targets (Hoskisson and Hitt 1988). Other research 
suggests that diversification supports corporate risk-taking as diversification enables firms to allocate 
resources more effectively through their internal capital markets to fund risky strategies across business 
units (Williamson 1975).  
Similarly, conflicting views also exist regarding how diversification may influence the relationship 
between top executives and corporate risk taking. Diversification affects top executives’ information 
processing in decision making (Williamson 1975). Highly diversified firms have information processing 
constraints that prevent corporate executives from obtaining sufficient knowledge about the strategic 
issues facing various individualdivisions (Dundas and Richardson 1982; Hill and Hoskisson 1987). In 
addition, competing demands from various divisions often disallow top executives to spend enough time 
collecting and processing information about the secondary industries. Such information processing 
constraints may result in top executives’ loss of control over risky projects in secondary areas. As a result, 
top executives in diversified firms are likely to forgo risk-taking initiatives, such as R&D, due to the 
concern about loss of control (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989). However, there is also an opposite view 
regarding the impact of the information processing effect of diversification (e.g., Eisenmann 2002). In 
diversified firms, much of the information received by top executives is in the form of summary reports 
(Hoskisson et al. 1991). The abstract information prevents top executives from more rationally ruling out 
the unlikely outcomes of risky projects, especially those projects in areas they are not familiar with. As a 
consequence, compared to projects in the primary industries, projects in the secondary industries are 
often associated with higher variance of prospective outcomes (i.e., higher risk). For top executives with 
risk-taking incentive, diversifying into unfamiliar secondary areas provides them more opportunities for 
seeking risk. Therefore, risk-seeking top managers in diversified firms may be more willing to take risk 
than those in focused firms (Eisenmann 2002). 
One way to resolve this conflict is to explicitly examine how top executives’ risk-taking incentive may lead 
to distinct risk-taking behavior in the focal firm’s primary and secondary industries. Such examination 
helps shed light on whether the information processing effect of diversification essentially enhances or 
impedes corporate risk taking. Prior studies, however, have mostly used data on corporate-level overall 
risk-taking and are thus not able to distinguish between risk-taking actions in primary industries and 
those in secondary industries. In this study, we use establishment-level IT data to generate more refined 
insights on this issue. Specifically, we consider focal firms’ aggressive IT implementation in their primary 
industries as well as in their secondary industries. If the risk incentive of top executives is associated with 
more aggressive IT implementation in secondary industries than in primary industries, it suggests that 
the information processing effect of diversification fosters risk-taking strategies. Top executives use the 
unfamiliar areas (secondary industries) as a key territory to pursue IT risk (e.g., adoption of more IT 
innovation, more radical business transformation using IT). On the other hand, if the risk incentive of top 
executives is associated with less aggressive IT implementation in secondary industries, it suggests that 
the effect of top executives concerns about the loss of control caused by information processing 
constraints dominates. In that case, they prefer to focus their strategic IT risk-taking in the primary 
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business areas in which they have better knowledge and control. Therefore, we develop the following two 
opposite hypotheses:   
H3a: Vega is associated with a higher level of aggressive IT implementation in focal firms’ secondary 
industries than in their primary industries;  
H3b: Vega is associated with a lower level of aggressive IT implementation in focal firms’ secondary 
industries than in their primary industries. 
Data and Measurement 
Data 
We used Harte-Hank’s Computer Intelligence (CI) database to obtain data on establishment-level IT 
implementation. We obtained IT implementation data on establishments from 1999 to 2009. Out of the 
entire sample of unique establishments, we were able to acquire the corresponding firm-level information 
of 199,348 unique establishments, which formed a sample of 10,241 unique firms. We used Compustat 
and Compustat Segment databases to obtain firm-level financial data, and used CRSP to obtain stock 
market data.  
We used the Execucomp database to obtain data on CEO and other top management compensation. 
Execucomp provides data on salary, bonus, and total compensation for the top five executives (ranked 
annually by salary and bonus). Following prior studies (Coles et al. 2006), we consider other top 
managers as those ranked in top five excluding CEO. We also followed the prior literature to eliminate 
firms in the utility, finance and insurance industries as these firms are subject to high regulation and 
therefore incentive payments play a less important role (Coles et al. 2006; Smith and Watts 1992). 
Limited by the availability of executive compensation data, the size of our firm-level sample further 
reduced to 9509 firm-year observations, with 1492 unique firms. We use Compustat database to obtain 
other firm accounting data used to construct control variables.  
Variables 
Regarding IT risk-taking, we use available data from CI database to develop measures on IT 
implementation in three key areas of IT: decentralized computing equipment (DCE), centralized 
computing equipment (CCE), and network communication equipment (NCE). Following the existing IT 
business value literature (Kleis et al. 2012; Chwelos et al. 2010), we use the number of PCs and 
workstations as a proxy for DCE, the number of servers as a proxy for CCE, and the number of network 
nodes as a proxy for NCE. We first assess the aggressive implementation of DCE, CCE and NCE at the 
establishment-level. The idea here is that large diversified firms often have different establishments in 
different industries. Each establishment may have its own IT needs based on its operational scale and 
industry environment. To assess whether a firm aggressively implements IT in a certain establishment, we 
need to take into account the establishment’s specific operational scale and industry context. Therefore, 
using establishment-level measures of DCE, CCE, and NCE, we run the following regression model for 
each (2 digit) industry-year subsample of establishments, 
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where Ei,t is the size (measured by the number of employees) of establishment i in year t, ∆Ei,t is the 
increase of establishment employees in year i and ∆Ei,t=Ei,t-Ei,t-1, Ri,t is the revenue of establishment i in 
year t, ∆Ri,t is the increase of establishment revenue in year i and ∆Ri,t=Ri,t-Ri,t-1. ITi,t is one of the three 
measures of IT implementation of establishment i in year t, i.e., ITi,t={DCEi,t, CCEi,t, NCEi,t}, and ∆ITi,t is 
the increase of establishment IT implementation in year i and ∆ITi,t=ITi,t-ITi,t-1.  
The regression in (1) characterizes the general pattern that establishments in a specific industry and a 
given year increase their IT implementation (on a per capita basis for normalization purpose) along with 
their growth of operational scale (measured by establishment revenue) and establishment size (measured 
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by establishment employee number). In other word, the regression line of (1) captures the normal level of 
establishment IT increase in each industry in a given year. We use the regression residuals from (1) to 
represent the establishment aggressive implementation of DCE, CCE, and NCE, denoted by AIDCE, 
AICCE, and AINCE, respectively. The central idea here is that a large residual value captures an 
“abnormal” increase in establishment IT implementation that cannot be explained by the establishment’s 
growth of business operations, given this establishment’s specific industry characteristics. The firm may 
aggressively implement more IT at an establishment level to strategically differentiate itself from the 
competitors in the same industry. For example, the firm may digitize more of the establishment’s business 
processes so as to achieve IT-enabled competitive advantage in this industry. However, in doing so, the 
firm needs to take the risk of investing in high-risk IT assets and face more technological uncertainty and 
managerial complexity in uncommon IT practices. Therefore, the aggressive increase in IT 
implementation reflects strategic risk-taking in IT. It is worth remarking that our approach of capturing 
abnormal IT increase is essentially similar to the approach used in the literature to study other types of 
abnormal operational activities of firms. For example, the literature on earnings management (e.g., 
Roychowdhury 2006) has employed a similar industry-based regression approach to assess the extent to 
which individual firms strategically use abnormal production activities to boost earnings.  
We then aggregate the establishment-level aggressive IT implementation measures into the firm-level, 
weighted by revenue shares of establishments. Firm-level measures capture the extent to which firms 
exceed their corresponding industry norms in increasing their IT implementation. To validate the use of 
these variables as measures of strategic risk taking in IT, we use a firm risk model to explicitly examine 
the extent to which these aggressive IT implementation strategies contribute to firm risk. As explained in 
more details below, we regress the market risk of firm against these three measures of aggressive IT 
implementation, controlling for several other firm characteristics that potentially cause firm risk. The 
market risk is measured using one-year volatility of monthly stock return. We focus on the market risk of 
the firm as the incentive compensation of executives is usually tied to the market performance and risk of 
firms. The control variables in the risk model include the commonly used variables in studying firm risk 
(e.g., Guay 1999; McAlister et al. 2007; Low 2009), such as R&D expenditure, advertising expenditure, 
capital investment, firm leverage, lagged risk, market risk, diversification, and firm sales (nature 
logarithm).    
Regarding executive compensation, we adopt the one-year approximation approach developed in Core 
and Guay (2002) to derive the vega and delta of the executive’s option portfolios. The approach of Core 
and Guay (2002) relies on the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation model, as modified by Merton (1973) 
to account for dividends, to assess the value of different types of options (e.g., newly granted and 
previously granted options, exercisable and unexercisable options) in the executive’s portfolio. Vega is 
defined as the change in the executive’s overall option value for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard 
deviation of stock returns.  Option Delta is defined as the change in the executive’s overall option value for 
a one percentage change in underlying stock price. This approach has been used extensively in the finance 
and accounting literature (e.g., Coles et al. 2006; Roulstone 2003) to study managerial incentives. Details 
of this approach are in the Appendix.  
The control variables that we use as determinants of IT risk-taking are all based on existing literature. 
Specifically, we include total delta and cash compensation (defined as the sum of base salary and bonus) 
to control for the impact of performance incentive and non-incentive compensation, respectively, of top 
executives (Coles et al. 2006). Total delta is the sum of option delta and equity delta (the sensitivity of 
total stock holding to a one-percent change in stock price). CEO tenure and CEO turnover (whether the 
CEO changed) were included to control for the potential impact of CEO personal characteristics on risk-
taking. We include Market-to-Book ratio and sales growth to control for investment and growth 
opportunities as such opportunities may influence firms’ risky investment policies (Coles et al. 2006). We 
include other investments that may drive risky IT initiatives, such as R&D expenditure, advertising 
expenditure, and capital expenditure (Dewan et al. 2011). To control for firms’ cash available to finance 
new projects, we included a measure of surplus cash as developed in Richardson (2006). Firm 
diversification was included as it is a key factor influencing corporate risk-taking. Finally, to control for 
firm size, we include the logarithm of sales. We also used industry dummies and year dummies to control 
for the industry fixed effect and the year fixed effect. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of key 
variables. Due to space limit, the correlation table is not included here but is available from the authors 
upon request.  
 Xue et al. / Executive Compensation and Strategic IT Risk Taking 
  
 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013 9 
Empirical Models 
We first examine the relationship between aggressive IT implementation and firm risk using an IT risk 
model. This approach is analogous to the analysis used in other studies on IT risk (e.g., Dewan et al. 
2007): regress overall firm market risk against risky IT strategies along with other control variables. In 
our case, we consider the aggressive implementation of three types of IT equipment (decentralized 
computing equipment, centralized computing equipment, and network communication equipment) as 
risky IT strategies. This model is also employed to verify the contributions of aggressive IT 
implementation to firm risk, so as to validate the use of these three measures of aggressive IT 
implementation to capture risk taking. We focus on firm market risk mainly because the incentive 
compensation to executives is usually based on the market performance of the firm. The specification of 
the IT risk model is as follows: 
[ ] ti,1ti,1ti,31ti,21ti,10ti, εControlsηAINCEαAICCEαAIDCEααRisk Firm +++++= −−−−  (2) 
We next examine the extent to which vega induces top executives to implement IT aggressively. As we 
consider three measures of aggressive IT implementation, we specify a system of three equations as 
follows,  
[ ] ti,1ti,11ti,1101ti, υControlsλVegaββAIDCE +++= −−     (3) 
[ ] ti,1ti,21ti,1202ti, σControlsλVegaββAICCE +++= −−     (4) 
[ ] ti,1ti,31ti,1303ti, τControlsλVegaββAINCE +++= −−     (5) 
 
Table 1a. Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Notation Definition Mean Std. 
Aggressive IT 
Implementation 
AIDCE 
The extent to which the increase of PCs and workstations exceeds the 
industry-norm level. -0.001 0.411 
AICCE 
The extent to which the increase of servers exceeds the industry-norm 
level. 0.000 0.038 
AINCE 
The extent to which the increase of network nodes exceeds the 
industry-norm level. -0.003 0.432 
Vega VEGA 
Sensitivity of option value to a 1% increase in standard deviation of 
stock return. 
241.69 515.09 
Delta DELTA 
Sensitivity of option and share holding value to a 0.01 increase in 
share price. 
1,722.8 2,440.5 
Cash Compensation CASH The sum of base salary and bonus. 4,545.6 3,289.6 
Firm Risk RISK Standard deviation of monthly stock return in the subsequent year. 0.116 0.066 
R&D Expenditure R&D Research and development expenditure to total assets. 0.028 0.058 
Advertising ADV Advertising expenditure to total assets. 0.025 0.053 
Capital Investment CAPX Capital investment to total assets. 0.055 0.050 
Leverage LVRG Total debts (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) to total assets.  0.240 0.203 
CEO Tenure TENU CEO’s number of years in the firm. 5.858 5.383 
CEO Turnover TNOV Indicator: 1 if CEO is replaced, 0 otherwise. 0.149 0.356 
Market-to-Book MTB Total market value to total book value of assets. 1.929 1.196 
Diversification DIV Entropy measure of firm diversification. 0.823 0.537 
Sales Growth SG One-year sales growth rate.  0.062 0.247 
Surplus Cash SPLS Cash from assets-in-place to total assets, as in Richardson (2006).  0.081 0.099 
Market Risk MKT 
Standard deviation of monthly return of the value-weighted return 
index from CRSP. 
0.043 0.017 
Firm Size SIZE Nature logarithm of total sales. 21.395 1.522 
DCE Intensity DCEI Total PCs and workstations per employee.  0.399 0.394 
CCE Intensity CCEI Total servers per employee. 0.021 0.042 
NCE Intensity NCEI Total network nodes per employee. 0.391 0.416 
Note: 1. The aggregate values of the top five executives are used for vega, delta and cash compensation; 2. 
Vega, delta, and cash compensation are in thousand 2009 dollars.   
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We include the lagged value of vega and other control variables as independent variables in the model to 
better capture how vega and other factors drive the decisions of aggressive IT implementation. We 
estimate the system of equations using different approaches, including OLS and seeming unrelated 
regression (SUR) (to take into account the potential correlation between these measures). As stated 
earlier, we expect that higher vega will result in higher levels of aggressive implementation of 
decentralized computing equipment, centralized computing equipment, and network communication 
equipment.  
To examine the potential differential impact of vega on IT risk-taking in the focal firm’s different 
industries, we distinguish between the aggressive IT implementation in the primary industries and that in 
the secondary industries. Specifically, we aggregate separately the aggressive IT implementation in the 
primary-industry establishments and the aggressive IT implementation in the secondary-industry 
establishments. For example, for a focal firm’s decentralized computing equipment (DCE), we construct 
two measures: the aggressive implementation of DCE in the primary 2-digit industry (denoted as 
AI_P_DCE) and that in the secondary 2-digit industries (denoted as AI_S_DCE). We then use seemingly 
unrelated regression to examine how vega influences both AI_P_DCE and AI_S_DCE, based on the same 
model specification as in eq. (3). We also use a similar approach to examine the aggressive 
implementation of centralized computing equipment and network communication equipment in the 
primary and secondary industries. We remove the firms with unavailable IT implementation information 
in the secondary-industry establishments. The sample size for this analysis reduces to 6685 firm-year 
observations.  
Results 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of the IT risk model using OLS, fixed-effect and random-effect 
models. As Table 2 indicates, the estimated coefficients of AIDCE, AICCE, and AINCE are positive and 
significant in all specifications, supporting H1. These results suggest that focal firms face more market 
risk when they differentiate themselves from industry peers by implementing more IT than that is needed 
to simply support their operational growth. The aggressive implementation of decentralized computing 
equipment, centralized computing equipment and network communication equipment may be driven by 
the firms’ intention to pursue long-term strategic IT initiatives (e.g., building more digitally-enabled 
business models). However, the technological uncertainty, managerial complexity and potential 
organizational changes associated with aggressive IT implementation may also cause unexpected 
outcomes and negatively affect the market performance of the firm. Turning to the estimates on other 
firm characteristics, the coefficients are generally consistent with expectations, including the positive 
coefficients of R&D expenditure (which in general represents riskier investments) and negative 
coefficients of capital investment (which in general represents safer investments (Core et al. 2006)).  
Table 2. IT Risk Model 
 OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Intercept 0.149*** (0.041) 0.193*** (0.049) 0.152*** (0.041) 
AIDCE 0.017*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.002) 
AICCE 0.068*** (0.014) 0.053*** (0.015) 0.063*** (0.014) 
AINCE 0.022*** (0.002) 0.022*** (0.002) 0.022*** (0.001) 
R&D 0.046*** (0.010) 0.081*** (0.020) 0.053*** (0.011) 
Advertising 0.005 (0.010) 0.030* (0.012) 0.011 (0.010) 
Capital Investment -0.013 (0.012) -0.038* (0.016) -0.020 (0.012) 
Leverage 0.014*** (0.003) 0.025*** (0.004) 0.016*** (0.003) 
Diversification -0.002* (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
Mkt. Risk 0.782 (0.731) 1.783* (0.748) 1.116 (0.721) 
Lagged Risk 0.399*** (0.009) 0.206*** (0.011) 0.343*** (0.009) 
Size -0.005*** (0.000) -0.008*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.000) 
Industry dummies and year dummies are used… 
R2 0.407 0.349 0.404 
Note: (1) † p<0.1;*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; (2) N=9509; (3) In parentheses are standard errors. 
 Xue et al. / Executive Compensation and Strategic IT Risk Taking 
  
 Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan 2013 11 
In Table 3, we present results on whether executive compensation structure affects the decision to pursue 
aggressive IT implementation. To the extent that aggressive IT implementation increases firm risk, we 
expect that higher vega will lead to higher levels of aggressive IT implementation. As Table 3 indicates, the 
coefficients of vega are positive and significant in all the three equations for decentralized computing 
equipment, centralized computing equipment, and network communication equipment. These results 
support H2, which suggests that higher risk-taking incentive provided in executive compensation 
(reflected by higher vega) drives firms to more aggressively implement IT than their competitors.  
While our main focus is on vega as the primary explanatory variable, the results on other aspects of 
compensation and other control variables are also worth noting. The coefficient estimates of delta are in 
general not significant across all the three equations. This suggests that the performance incentive 
provided in compensation does not drive the aggressive implementation of IT. These results are in line 
with the risk aversion assumption for top executives. As higher delta ties more executive compensation to 
performance, it also exposes executives to more firm risk (i.e., the uncertainty of performance). Risk-
averse executives should therefore have no incentive to further pursue more aggressive IT 
implementation. The negative coefficients of cash compensation suggest that executives compensated 
with more salary and bonus are even less likely to pursue aggressive IT implementation. A potential 
explanation is that executives relying more on cash compensation are more concerned about the short-
term earning-decreasing effect of IT and therefore choose to maximize their cash compensation incomes 
by minimizing IT spending (Masli 2009).   
Table 3. Aggressive IT Implementation 
 AIDCE AICCE AINCE 
Intercept 0.392** (0.115) 0.008 (0.012) 0.130 (0.125) 
Vega 0.005** (0.002) 0.001** (0.000) 0.005** (0.002) 
Delta -0.003 (0.004) 0.000 (0.000) -0.003 (0.004) 
Cash Compensation -0.032*** (0.009) -0.002** (0.001) -0.027** (0.009) 
CEO Tenure 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 
CEO Turnover 0.013 (0.011) 0.001 (0.001) -0.009 (0.012) 
Market-to-Book 0.006 (0.004) 0.001† (0.000) 0.004 (0.004) 
R&D 0.273*** (0.075) 0.010 (0.008) 0.066 (0.082) 
Advertising 0.073 (0.069) 0.024** (0.007) 0.059 (0.075) 
Capital Investment 0.057 (0.081) 0.008 (0.008) 0.281** (0.088) 
Leverage -0.021 (0.019) 0.001 (0.002) -0.033 (0.021) 
Sales Growth 0.018 (0.015) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.008 (0.017) 
Surplus Cash -0.010 (0.045) -0.008† (0.005) -0.053 (0.049) 
Diversification -0.015 (0.010) -0.001 (0.001) -0.012 (0.008) 
Lagged Risk 0.310*** (0.060) 0.006* (0.003) 0.515*** (0.065) 
Size 0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.000) 0.008* (0.004) 
DCE Intensity 0.044*** (0.009)   
CCE Intensity  0.130*** (0.009)  
NCE Intensity   0.090*** (0.010) 
Industry dummies and year dummies are used… 
R2 0.299 0.126 0.245 
χ2 4079.36*** 1399.06*** 3155.12*** 
Note: (1) † p<0.1;*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; (2) N=9509; (3) In parentheses are standard errors; (4) 
Log values are used for Vega, Delta, and Cash Compensation.  
 
Table 4 presents the results on the comparison between primary and secondary industries. In the models 
on decentralized computing equipment and network communication equipment, the coefficient of vega in 
the equation for secondary industries are positive and significantly higher than that in the equation for 
primary industries. These findings support H3, suggesting that higher vega results in more aggressive 
implementation of decentralized computing equipment and network communication equipment in focal 
firms’ secondary industries than in primary industries. Regarding centralized computing equipment, the 
coefficients in both equations are positive but not significantly different from each other. A potential 
explanation is that the investment decisions on centralized computing equipment are more based on the 
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overall corporate-level computing needs, and therefore the industry difference between establishments 
matters less. In general, the findings support the hypothesis that the risk incentive provided in executive 
compensation result in more strategic IT risk taking in in focal firms’ secondary industries than in 
primary industries.  
  
Table 4. Aggressive IT Implementation In Primary and Secondary Industries 
 AIDCE AICCE AINCE 
 Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
Intercept 
0.612*** 
(0.124) 
0.503*** 
(0.156) 
0.004  
(0.011) 
0.029*  
(0.015) 
0.486***  
(0.135) 
0.391*  
(0.176) 
Vega 
0.004*  
(0.002) 
0.008**  
(0.002) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.001*  
(0.000) 
0.004*  
(0.002) 
0.010***  
(0.003) 
Delta 
-0.003  
(0.004) 
-0.013**  
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001  
(0.000) 
-0.003  
(0.004) 
-0.008  
(0.006) 
Cash Compensation 
-0.028**  
(0.010) 
-0.024**  
(0.012) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.026*  
(0.011) 
-0.027*  
(0.014) 
CEO Tenure 
0.000  
(0.001) 
0.000  
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000  
(0.000) 
-0.002†  
(0.001) 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
CEO Turnover 
0.020  
(0.012) 
0.001  
(0.015) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
0.006  
(0.013) 
-0.023  
(0.017) 
Market-to-Book 
0.004  
(0.003) 
0.005  
(0.004) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.000  
(0.000) 
0.006  
(0.004) 
-0.004  
(0.005) 
R&D 
0.347**  
(0.100) 
0.244*  
(0.125) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.010  
(0.012) 
-0.091  
(0.109) 
0.205  
(0.142) 
Advertising 
0.104  
(0.076) 
0.051  
(0.096) 
0.003  
(0.007) 
0.021*  
(0.009) 
0.038  
(0.083) 
0.032  
(0.108) 
Capital Investment 
-0.045  
(0.092) 
-0.025  
(0.115) 
0.007  
(0.008) 
0.012  
(0.011) 
-0.033  
(0.100) 
-0.007  
(0.130) 
Leverage 
-0.029  
(0.023) 
-0.016  
(0.029) 
0.000  
(0.002) 
-0.001  
(0.003) 
-0.024  
(0.025) 
-0.059†  
(0.033) 
Sales Growth 
0.029†  
(0.017) 
0.032  
(0.022) 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
0.005*  
(0.002) 
0.023†  
(0.019) 
0.025  
(0.024) 
Surplus Cash 
-0.013  
(0.051) 
-0.035  
(0.065) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.002  
(0.006) 
0.099  
(0.056) 
-0.018  
(0.073) 
Diversification 
0.007  
(0.009) 
-0.011  
(0.011) 
-0.001† 
(0.001) 
-0.000  
(0.001) 
0.001  
(0.009) 
-0.024†  
(0.012) 
Lagged Risk 
0.091*  
(0.042) 
0.124*  
(0.053) 
0.002  
(0.006) 
0.009†  
(0.005) 
0.002  
(0.080) 
0.123*  
(0.054) 
Size 
-0.008*  
(0.004) 
-0.004  
(0.005) 
0.001  
(0.000) 
0.000  
(0.000) 
-0.003  
(0.004) 
0.003  
(0.006) 
DCE Intensity 
0.031**  
(0.011) 
0.034*  
(0.014)     
CCE Intensity 
  
0.046*** 
(0.009) 
0.073*** 
(0.013) 
  
NCE Intensity 
  
  0.039***  
(0.011) 
0.063***  
(0.015) 
Industry dummies and year dummies are used… 
R2 0.162 0.213 0.096 0.084 0.158 0.213 
χ2 1287.80*** 1809.75*** 397.15*** 308.43*** 1256.30*** 1804.81*** 
Note: (1) † p<0.1;*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; (2) N=6685; (3) In parentheses are standard errors. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study makes two key contributions to the existing literature. First, our results shed light on a direct 
relationship between the characteristics of top executives and corporate IT strategies in the context of risk 
taking. This finding helps better explain the upper-echelon perspective on how top management influence 
is critical for corporate IT implementation (Clemons and Row 1988; Jarvenpaa and Ives 1991; Armstrong 
and Sambamurthy 1999). Moreover, our study also adopts a corporate governance perspective. By 
examining the compensation of executives, our study suggests that offering top executives the risk taking 
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incentive of fosters corporate IT strategies that entail high risk. The existing literature on IT risk has 
clearly indicated the positive association between risk and return of IT (Dewan et al. 2007; Tanriverdi and 
Ruefli 2004; Dewan and Ren 2011). However, when risk-averse managers are exposed to firm risk (e.g., 
through performance incentive in their compensation), they may forgo risky IT projects and consequently 
the long-term strategic return of IT may be difficult to realize. Therefore, an important managerial 
implication from this study is that corporate owners can design the risk incentive in compensation 
structure to motivate top executives and corporate IT risk taking so as to realize the long-term strategic 
benefits of IT. 
The second key contribution of this study is to provide a deeper understanding of how firm diversification 
influences corporate risk-taking. Although the extant literature has recognized that firm diversification 
may negatively affect the information processing capacity of top executives, conflicting views exist 
regarding how this information processing effect eventually influences managerial risk-taking. While 
some research argues that firm diversification mitigates the risk-taking  as top managers are concerned 
about the loss of control due to information asymmetry (e.g., Baysinger and Hoskisson 1989); other 
research argues that diversification provides top executives more opportunities for pursuing risky 
strategies in the secondary business areas that they are less familiar with (e.g., Eisenmann 2002). Prior 
studies were not able to resolve this issue as most of them have focused on firm-level overall 
diversification and risk-taking and therefore could not distinguish between risk-taking behaviors in 
different business areas. This research uses establishment-level IT data to better examine this issue. We 
compare IT risk taking in the primary industries of focal firms with that in the secondary industries. Our 
results indicate that the risk incentive of top executives is associated with more aggressive IT 
implementation in the secondary industries (than in the primary industries) of focal firms. The insight is 
that motivated by risk incentives, top executives adopt secondary industries as the areas to realize more IT 
risk-taking. Therefore, our study provides clearer evidence to support the view that diversification into 
less familiar areas supports the risk-taking of top executives.  
This study also has some limitations that are need to be acknowledged. First, in assessing IT risk taking, 
our measures of aggressive IT implementation mainly capture the investment in internal hardware 
infrastructure. Although hardware infrastructure implementation accounts for a significant portion of 
corporate IT budget and we also validate our measures by explicitly showing that they contribute to firm 
risk, we have to acknowledge that these hardware-based measures are not sufficient to characterize all 
aspects of IT risk taking. IT may also be caused by the failure of other IT initiatives, such system 
implementation (e.g. ERP, CRM, SCM, etc). In this regard, in order to better understand the overall risk 
taking in IT, other risky IT initiatives are worth considering. Second, our study focuses on the market risk 
of the firm. The main reason is that the incentive compensation of executives is usually tied to the market 
performance of the firm. However, the incentive for seeking operational risk is not easily assessed using 
the available compensation data. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent top executives are also motivated 
by compensation to seek operational risk. Third, due to the nature of our data, we are not able to observe 
the exact roles of these top executives in IT decision making.  
There are many promising areas for future research. First, using other research approaches (e.g., survey), 
future research may specifically measure the risk-taking intention of top executives and further explore 
how compensation structure motivates the IT risk-taking decisions. Second, future research may examine 
different types of risky IT initiatives, especially those in the new technological areas such as social media, 
mobile computing and cloud computing. More evidence is needed to show if compensation motivates 
corporate executives to strategically adopt these emerging technologies. Third, in addition to 
diversification, future research may also consider how the relationship between executive compensation 
and IT risk-taking may be influenced by many other organizational factors, such as corporate hierarchical 
organization, board structure, and demographic characteristics of top executives.   
Appendix: Derivation of Vega and Delta 
As in Core and Guay (2002), stock option value is calculated based on the Black-Sholes (1973) formula for 
valuing European call options, as modified to account for dividend payouts by Merton (1973). Specifically,  
( ) ( )( )21rTdT σTZNXeZNSeOV −−= −−  
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where ( ) ( )[ ] ( )212 σT2σdrTXSlnZ +−+= , N(.) is cumulative probability function for the normal 
distribution, S is the price of the underlying stock at fiscal year-end, X is the option exercise price, σ is the 
expected stock return volatility estimated using 5-year annualized volatility of stock return prior to the 
fiscal year, r is the risk-free interest rate, T is the time to maturity of option, d is the expected dividend 
yield estimated using 5-year average dividend yield rate as of the fiscal year. The vega and delta measures 
are the option value’s sensitivity with respect to a 0.01 change in stock return volatility and a 1 percent 
change in stock price, respectively. Therefore,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )100SZN'e100SSOVDelta   0.01;STZN'e0.01σOVVega dT21dT −− =∂∂=×=×∂∂=  
where N’(.) is the normal probability density function.  
We obtain/calculate S, σ and d using data from CRSP. r is also estimated using Treasury yields from 
CRSP. Regarding X and T, we followed Core and Guay (2002) to distinguish between newly granted 
options, previously granted exercisable options, and previously granted unexercisable options. X and T for 
new grants are obtained directly from Execomp. For previously granted options (exercisable as well as 
unexercisable), we estimate their X by subtracting the realized values (excess of stock price over exercise 
price) of exercisable options and unexercisable options from the stock price. T of previously granted 
options is determined based on whether or not there were new grants in the most recent fiscal year. If 
there were new grants, T of previously granted unexercisable options is set to one year less than the T of 
recent grants. Otherwise, T of previously granted unexercisable options is set to nine years. T of previously 
granted exercisable options is set to three years less than that of previously granted unexercisable options.  
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